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The image of the Middle East projected in current
public discourses is one imbued with religion. Media
consumers would be forgiven for assuming that the
region consists of angry bearded men prostrating
themselves in prayer when not shaking their fists
and burning American flags, and shadowy women
with headscarves or chadors. The region is 'the Islam-
ic world', religion stamped on every aspect of its life
and function. The 'clash of civilizations' idea, much
criticized, remains a potent notion both in the West
and in Muslim circles. A mythical totalized 'Muslim
world' is opposed to an equally mythical unified
'West', with religion as the essence of the former and
the main key to its politics and society.
Religious Authority
and Public Life 
We are talking about complex and differen-
tiated societies. They comprise political and
cultural fields with diverse forces and many
contests. Many of the cities in the Middle
East have been, and often remain, the loca-
tions of cosmopolitan cultures with features
of originality. The cosmopolitan Alexandria
of past decades may be seen as the creation
of foreigners, now long gone, leaving a few
architectural traces in a ramshackle poor
city bursting with overpopulated slums. But
this image hides the native participation in
ideas and movements in that city and the
genuine mixture of peoples and cultures
that prevailed. The foreigners were not just
a rich stratum separated from the natives,
but comprised proletarian and petty bour-
geois sectors, such as Italian dock workers
and Greek shop-keepers, intimately inter-
mingled with the native Egyptian urbanites.
Cairo was the location of many secular and
cosmopolitan cultural spheres. In the 1930s
Cairo hosted the Arab music congress in
which its musical luminaries, such as Mu-
hammad Abdul-Wahab, argued about the
musical renaissance not only with fellow
Arabs but also with Bella Bartok. Edward
Evans Pritchard was delivering his seminal
lectures on primitive religion at the Egypt-
ian, now Cairo University. Are all these lite
activities that left the bulk of the population
in traditional and religious milieus? Wrong:
the flourishing film industry captivated the
fancy and imagination of the populace, not
just in Egypt but throughout the Arab
world, where the current songs were on
every lip, and where a faithful audience of
urbanites from taxi drivers to porters mem-
orized the dialogue of popular films and
gave a running commentary to new view-
ers. Now this fascination with film is further
reinforced by television screens in many
homes and cafs, broadcasting soaps,
sports, and musical entertainment along-
side the religious programmes and moral
homilies so characteristic of pious Egypt.
Where was religion prior to its political
resurgence in the 1970s? Of course it was
there, but in many forms and guises, mixed
in with other elements of culture and poli-
tics. Of course there were the bearded men
of al-Azhar, and different bearded men of
the Muslim Brotherhood. The religion of the
people, however, was much more relaxed
and syncretistic, including music, song,
dance, and even exotic substances often
frowned upon by the orthodox. Popular rit-
uals and celebration, such as those of the
Prophet's birthday and the commemoration
of the saints draw vast crowds to the pre-
sent day. Popular religiosity also mixed hap-
pily with other elements of celebratory cul-
ture. It is exemplified in the popular song
sung by Abdul-Muttalib: sakin fi hayy al-
sayyida wa-habibi sakin fil-husayn, w a - ' a l a
shan anul kull al-rida yomat aruhlu marratain
('I live in the quarter of al-Sayyida [Zaynab]
(a shrine district of central Cairo) and my
beloved lives in al-Hussayn (another shrine
district), and in order to attain maximum
merit I visit him twice a day'), which situates
his love in the sacred geography of Cairo. 
Modernity and secularization
'Secularization' is not necessarily 'secular-
ism'. It is not an ideological commitment
against religion, but a socio-cultural process
by which religion becomes differentiated
and separated from other social and cultural
spheres, which it previously dominated. In
Europe, the Renaissance, the Reformation,
then the Enlightenment, and the scientific
revolution all contributed to this process,
but it was the revolutionary dynamic of cap-
italism above all that broke up the communi-
ties and institutions that enshrined religious
domination. In the Middle East, the dynamic
of capitalist incorporation was part of West-
ern domination, and was telescoped into a
relatively short historical span. A crucial pe-
culiarity of capitalist domination is that it en-
ters into the very economy of desire of bod-
ies and psyches, offering an ever-expanding
range of gratifications. These are not only
'material' but often 'spiritual' and intellectu-
al: it engenders new and diverse forms of
knowledge and imagination, an ever-de-
manding curiosity.1 It demolishes the narrow
horizons of community, of kinship, and hier-
archical authority by providing means of
critical knowledge of the workings of social
and political organization. The new middle
classes in the urban centres of the 19t h a n d
2 0t h centuries were and remain thirsty for the
new forms of knowledge as much as for the
material commodities feeding new lifestyles. 
The consequence of these developments
of modernity was the progressive loss and
fragmentation of religious authority. Law
was separated from its religious locations in
the ulama and their institutions, and as-
signed to government ministries and courts
with personnel trained in secular law
schools. Codified state law was largely de-
rived from European models, but even the
portion on family law derived from the s h a r-
ica in most countries became state law under
secular legal institutions. Religious authori-
ties attempted to intervene in and control
the new cultural spheres of media, publish-
ing, and entertainment, but with only spo-
radic success largely confined to instances in
which items in these spheres directly chal-
lenged orthodox truths. The ulama, howev-
er, largely acquiesced in the separation of
the various spheres of politics, law, and cul-
ture from religion. When religious chal-
lenges to these spheres emerged the
sources were more likely to be the Islamic
militants than the establishment ulama.
The modern sphere, however, did not
leave Islam to the ulama, but from the time
of Abduh (d. 1905) had attempted to incor-
porate it into its modern discourses. Ahmad
Amin, Abbas Mahmud al-cA q q a d, and Taha
Hussein, among others, were Egyptian writ-
ers with European education and knowl-
edge of languages. In the 1930s they all
wrote books on Islam and its history, claim-
ing the 'real' and pure Islam of the Prophet
for modernity, against the obscurantism of
al-Azhar and its ulama. In effect, these writ-
ers and many that followed them appropri-
ated Islam for modernity and removed it
from its traditional contexts of jurisprudence
and authority. This is an essentially seculariz-
ing step. 
I s l a m i s m
Islamism also appropriated Islam for
modernity, but in a radically different direc-
tion. A central element in modern Islamism is
the attempt to impose religious authority on
culture and society. Central quests in this re-
spect are the moralization of public space, the
imposition of ritual observance, and the cen-
sorship of cultural and entertainment prod-
ucts. Whether in government or opposition
(and it straddles both) this strand of Islamism
reinforces social control and authoritarian
rule and is much favoured by the regimes in
the region. This quest coincides with a wider
cultural nationalism, seeking the restoration
of authenticity, which, as always, is construct-
ed. The history of modernity, it is argued, is
one of the imposition and invasion of West-
ern culture and institutions on a colonized
Muslim society, and it is now time to reverse
this invasion by reviving authentic culture.
The demand for the application of the sharica
is central to this quest. Given that the histori-
cal sharica and its institutions are problematic
and often irrelevant in a modern state and so-
ciety, as the Iranian Republic was to discover,2
the elements of it which are most clearly at
variance with modern sensibilities (dubbed
'Western', but in fact common to many sec-
tors of people all over the world) are high-
lighted. Thus so-called Qur'anic punishments
of amputations, executions, and stoning are
adopted by dictators and authoritarian chiefs
(Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, the Taliban,
Northern Nigeria), flaunted as Islamic. The
irony is that these acts are described by many
as 'medieval' barbarism, when in fact me-
dieval jurists and judges imposed many and
restrictive conditions on these punishments,
and the high standards of evidence demand-
ed by the sharica were hard to satisfy. It is
modern dictators who relish their application,
both as demonstration of their religious de-
votion and justice and as intimidation and
threat to political opposition.
Similarly, the veiling of women and the pro-
hibition of interest (which means disguising
it) and of alcohol become easy hallmarks of Is-
lamicity, when all the institutions of state and
society and most spheres of culture have
clearly nothing to do with religion, but are
products of technical and cultural modernity.
One episode illustrates the hollowness of this
quest for authenticity. A classic book of medi-
cine by the medieval doctor and philosopher
al-Razi3 includes a chapter on wine and its
medical qualities, finding its moderate con-
sumption to be largely beneficial. The manu-
script of this book was printed in the 19th cen-
tury, then issued in many successive editions.
It was only in a Beirut edition in 1985 that the
chapter on wine was censored, the editor ex-
plaining in a preface that such discourse was
inappropriate in a classic book of 'Islamic'
medicine. The modern Islamic editor, then,
imposed authenticity on the medieval her-
itage of the region.
Conservative Islamic attempts at imposing
authority and morality come up against sec-
tors of society now accustomed to personal
autonomy, as well as the forces of desire, lib-
erated by the processes of modernity, which
broke up the patriarchal community. To Iran-
ian youth Western pop and football stars are
much more meaningful than velayet-e faqih .
Egyptian students resort to an odd concept of
Islamic law, that of curfi or customary mar-
riage, to co-habit with lovers without their
parents' knowledge or consent, to the out-
rage of the moral censors and the press.
Egyptian authorities, religious and secular,
pursue imagined satanic cults, pornographic
displays, erotic chewing gum (supposedly
distributed by Israeli agents to corrupt Mus-
lim girls), homosexual conspiracies, and er-
rant authors Ð all in their tireless efforts to
eradicate deviant and inauthentic cultures,
products of Western corruption. This para-
noid vigilance fits in well with the aims of au-
thoritarian rule and a sensationalist press. But
does it signal a losing battle? 
An Egyptian
couple strolls past
a cinema.
